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1 Between- and within-employer inequality
There has been a recent resurgence in interest among academic and policy circles in income in-
equality trends around the world. Studies of the differences in income between and within popu-
lation subgroups such as education groups, races, or genders continues to be a hot topic in current
debates. Yet the study of between- and within-group inequality is not a new phenomenon. Fortin
et al. (2011) give a comprehensive overview of decomposition methods in economics, with their
roots reaching back to at least Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) seminal work on wage differen-
tials, and later Bourguignon (1979) contribution on inequality decompositions.
A more recent literature has emphasized the importance of an individual’s workplace in deter-
mining wage income. The interest of the workplace as a determinant of income inequality stems
from the fact that classical wage regressions fail to explain a substantial part of the observed over-
all variation in earnings (Mincer, 1974; Heckman et al., 2003). Challenging the competitive wage
setting paradigm, Krueger and Summers (1988) show that there are large pay differences between
seemingly identical workers employed in different sectors of the U.S. economy, with other studies
arriving at similar conclusions across many countries1.Yet substantial wage differentials between
workers within industries remained unexplained.
∗This piece was used as background material for the International Labour Organization (ILO) Global Wage Report
2016/17 available at this link. The ILO is a specialized agency of the United Nations.
†Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027 (e-mail:
c.moser@columbia.edu). Email: c.moser@columbia.edu
1Other studies for the U.S. include Katz and Revenga (1989), Bound and Johnson (1992), and Murphy and Welch
(1992).
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To address this gap, a recent strand of work has examined the patterns of income inequality
between and within employers, i.e. either firms or establishments. This analysis is based on a
decomposition of the variance of overall (log) earnings into two components: first, the between-
firm dispersion in workers’ average earnings; and second, the within-firm dispersion of workers’
earnings conditional on between-firm level differences. Formally, we can write the (log) earnings
of worker i at employer j at time t , denoted yijt, using the identity:
yijt = y¯t + (y¯t j − y¯t) + (yijt − y¯t j)
where y¯t stands for economy-wide average earnings and y¯t j denotes average earnings within
employer j, both at time t. Taking variances on both sides and simplifying we get that the overall
variance of (log) earnings of worker at employer j at time t can be written as:
Var(yijt) = Var(y¯t) + Var(yijt|i ∈ j)
where the first term on the right hand side denotes the variance of average earnings at the em-
ployer level, and the second term denotes the variance of earnings within employers conditional
on between-employer differences in average pay.
In recent work, Alvarez et al. (2016) apply this decomposition into between- versus within-
firm earnings inequality to Brazil’s formal labor market and find that almost two thirds of the
overall earnings dispersion in Brazil’s formal sector in 1996 comes from between-firm differences
in average earnings, i.e. the first component in the above decomposition. Conversely, one third of
the overall dispersion comes from within-firm differences in pay, i.e. the second component above.
Moreover, the authors show that between 1996 and 2012, most of Brazil’s decline in earnings
inequality is explained by falling between-firm pay heterogeneity, while a fall in the within-firm
pay distribution contributed less.
For the pre-period from 1986-1995 in Brazil, Helpman et al. (2016) show that most of the rise
in wage dispersion during those years is also explained by rising between-firm pay heterogeneity.
Akerman et al. (2013) confirm that also in Sweden from 2001-2007 a large share of overall wage
inequality is observed within sectors and occupations for seemingly identical workers, but less of
it is explained by between-firm pay differences. In recent work, Barth et al. (2016) show that in
the United States a large share of the increase in earnings inequality between the 1970s and 2010s
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is explained by rising dispersion of earnings among establishments. Song et al. (2016) show that
in the U.S., contrary to the case of Brazil, the within-firm variance is larger than the between-firm
variance for the period from 1978 to 2013. But looking at changes over time, they find, that two-
thirds of the increase in wage inequality can be explained by growing wage inequality between
firms, and one-third by the increase in wage inequality within firms.
Together, these findings suggest that the workplace may be a quantitatively important com-
ponent in wage determination and that changes in the distribution of firm-level pay can explain a
substantial share of overall earnings inequality movements over the last few decades.–the rise and
subsequent fall in earnings inequality in Brazil between 1986 and 2012, as well as the secular rise
in earnings inequality in and the United States between the 1970s and 2010s, and more recently in
Sweden.
2 Two-way fixed effects decomposition
The central challenge in interpreting pay differences between firms is to distinguish between true
firm-specific pay premia versus underlying worker heterogeneity. The observation that workers
at some firms are paid more highly than other workers at other firms could derive from two
fundamental sources of heterogeneity: One the one hand, the identical worker could face large
pay gaps between firms, referred to as between-firm pay differences or firm pay heterogeneity.
On the other hand, workers may differ in earnings even conditional on their employer identity,
which refer to as between-worker pay differences or worker pay heterogeneity.
Both types of heterogeneity—between firms and between workers—will generally show up
in the observed earnings distribution. Indeed, the two are indistinguishable in cross-sectional
data. To tell apart underlying firm pay differences form worker pay differences, Abowd, Kramarz
and Margolis (1999a, henceforth AKM) suggested following workers across different employers
in longitudinal data. Under standard econometric assumptions2, the pay differences within an
individual across different employers is informative of the relative pay component across firms.
Furthermore, the average earnings net of the firm pay differences for a given worker of fixed
characteristics is then informative of the underlying worker pay heterogeneity. They show that a
model with worker- and firm-fixed effects in addition to worker and firm characteristics can be
2See Abowd and Kramarz (1999) and Card et al. (2013) for details.
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estimated by the method of Ordinary Least Squares using linked employer-employee data.
Starting with AKM’s seminal contribution, a growing literature has employed the two-way
fixed effects framework to investigate the sources of wage inequality. While AKM’s original study
was on French labor markets, similar decompositions of overall wage inequality into firm- and
worker-components have been applied to labor markets around the world. Later work includes
Andrews et al. (2008) and Card et al. (2013) for Germany, Iranzo et al. (2008) for Italy, Card et al.
(2016) for Portugal, Lopes de Melo (2016) and Alvarez et al. (2016) for Brazil, Bonhomme et al.
(2016) for Sweden, as well as Abowd et al. (1999b), Woodcock (2015), Sorkin (2016) and Song et al.
(2016) for the United States.
Although these studies differ in important methodological aspects, their results are approxi-
mately in line with a decomposition of overall cross-sectional earnings inequality into 50% due to
worker pay heterogeneity, 20% due to firm pay heterogeneity, and an overall explanatory power
(R2) in the range of 85%. Furthermore, Card et al. (2013), Alvarez et al. (2016), and Song et al.
(2016) attribute a substantial share of the shifts in earnings inequality over time to changes in the
distribution of firm pay heterogeneity in the AKM framework. Therefore, these findings broadly
underline the levels and time trends in between- and within-firm inequality highlighted by the
previously mentioned literature.
An important follow-up investigation to the AKM decomposition is: what underlying factors
give rise to firm-pay differences on the one hand and worker-pay differences on the other hand? To
address this question, Alvarez et al. (2016) find that a close to 60% of the pay heterogeneity across
employers is explained by differences in labor productivity, measured by value added per worker
at the firm-level. Barth et al. (2016) also find that revenues per worker at the establishment-level is
a significant predictor of employer pay differences in the United States, although they find weaker
explanatory power.3 On the worker side, Alvarez et al. (2016) find a moderate correlation between
proxies for workers’ human capital and worker pay. Yet a weakening link between productivity
and pay accounts for the largest share of the decline in dispersion of both worker pay and firm
pay over time.
3A potential explanation for why Barth et al. (2016) find a weaker correlation between establishment-level revenue
per worker and employee pay could be that theirs is not a direct measure of productivity. Many models would predict
a direct relationship between labor productivity and worker pay, but not necessarily between revenues per employee
and worker pay.
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3 Some implications for the human capital model of wages
The new literature surrounding firm-level pay differences challenges the classical view of com-
petitive labor markets, in which workers of different skill groups are each paid their marginal
product4. This classical view is based on the notion that workers can move freely between em-
ployers, leading the ladder to bid wage rates up to the competitive level at which the marginal
cost of a worker, i.e. their wage, is equated to their marginal product in production. Through
this lens, differences in pay across employers—while controlling for time-varying human capital
proxies such as education and labor market experience—would be interpreted as differences in
marginal products for the same worker at different firms. The looming question is then: why do
workers not relocate to the most productive, hence highest-paying firms in the economy?
Two explanations for this conundrum have been put forth: The first explanation reconciles
observed firm pay differences with the presence of unobserved but heterogeneous non-pecuniary
(or non-wage) benefits across employers. These amenities may include qualities of the workplace
such as geographic location, office culture and environment, and other unmeasured employee
benefits such as employer health care and pension benefit contributions. In this framework, wages
act as compensating differentials between employers of different non-wage qualities5. Sorkin
(2016) applies such a framework to linked employer-employee data from a subset of the United
States labor force and concludes that compensating differentials are at least as important as wage
differentials in explaining worker flows between employers. More broadly, an open question re-
mains to what extent non-wage amenities can explain wage dispersion within and across firms in
other contexts.
The second explanation deviates from the competitive view of labor markets and instead fo-
cuses on determinants of rent sharing between firms and their employees in frictional labor mar-
kets. In this view, worker relocation is costly, in terms of resources or time, and potentially has a
stochastic (unexplained) component. For example, a currently unemployed individual may search
for jobs but could not know the entire list of job postings potentially available to them. Such an
individual may at first become employed at a relatively unproductive, low-paying, local firm that
had a salient job vacancy posted. But throughout their career, the individual may find better and
better job opportunities, being poached by firms with higher productivity or a better personal job
4See also Krueger and Summers (1988) for a similar argument at the industry-level.
5See Rosen (1974), (1987) and Lazear and Shaw (2007) for explorations of such theories.
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match. In such a world, pay differences between employers may persist and show up in estimated
firm pay differences in the AKM framework.
A myriad of frameworks, commonly summarized under the heading of search models, in-
corporate such labor market imperfections into an economic environment of wage setting with
worker and firm heterogeneity6. What these frameworks have in common is that a firm-worker
relationship generates rents that in the presence of imperfect labor market competition are split,
usually non-trivially, between employers and employees. This deviation from the competitive
framework has starkly different implications for labor market efficiency and total factor produc-
tive relative to the classical framework of labor demand being equated to labor supply for all
workers in the economy.
Across firms, the key distinguishing factor between these theories is the presence or absence
of abnormal firm rents. In classical theories, firm pay heterogeneity arises only as a result of dif-
ferences in labor productivities across firms. But such productivities are hard to reconcile with
widely documented regularities in labor market dynamics, including the systematic movement
of workers towards higher-paying firms over their life cycle7. In theory, both theories are empir-
ically testable if individual worker productivity and pay is observed; yet requirements on data
availability of this kind make this hard to test directly and more work is needed to distinguish
between the two.
Within firms, what distinguishes the classical from the frictional view of labor markets is again
the presence of rents, but in this context across worker types. Differences in pay across workers
within a firm may derive to some extent from observable and unobservable worker productivity
differences. Yet a second component of worker pay, which may be heterogeneous across different
worker types such as occupations or skill groups, may be related to the extent to which workers
capture rents in a given employment relationship. For example, Cahuc et al. (2006) find differ-
ences in bargaining power across different worker skill groups, with intermediate- and low-skilled
workers having substantially lower bargaining power than high-skilled worker in the context of
France. Similarly, workers of different occupations or at different levels of the firm hierarchy may
be able to capture different amounts of rents, and this heterogeneity may be influenced by institu-
6See McCall (1970), Mortensen (1970), Lucas and Prescott (1974), Diamond (1982), Pissarides (1985), and Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) as classical examples of such environments.
7See Bontemps et al. (1999), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), and Engbom and Moser (2016) for evidence in support
of this job ladder view of labor markets in different contexts.
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tional details such as collective bargaining agreements and compensation policies. Stories of pure
rent capturing have gained much attention in the recent debate around the Top 1% and bonus
pay policies, particularly in the highest paid sectors and among chief executive officers (CEOs).
Yet there exists little concrete evidence on the nature of wage setting for top earners, including
CEOs, and hence statements about rent sharing and rent appropriation must be considered with
caution8.
4 Policy implications
4.1 Minimum wage
A minimum wage acts directly as an institutional wage floor on the pay for workers in the for-
mal sector, as well as indirectly as an outside option for workers in or out of employment. An
online database published by the International Labour Organization shows that national nominal
minimum wages have followed diverging trends across countries. While many Latin American
countries have increased the minimum wage in real value and some European countries like Ger-
many have recently introduced a minimum wage for the first time, the real minimum wage has
been declining in many other contexts. How do these trends affect the income distribution in
general, and the decomposition into between- and within-firm pay inequality in particular?
A binding minimum wage generically affects both within- and between-firm earnings inequal-
ity components9. As the minimum rises from non-binding to binding levels, it will by definition
push up first and foremost the lowest wages in the economy. This will—all else equal—compress
wages within the lowest-paying firms, hence reduce within-firm inequality. But at the same time,
by raising the lowest-paying firms’ average pay, it will also lead to convergence in between-firm
pay. Quantitatively, the extent to which each of these components is affected by the minimum
wage will depend on the initial distribution of pay within and between firms. In the Brazilian case,
where between-firm inequality dominated in 1996 and explains the larger share of the inequality
decline until 2012, one study found that, accounting for worker and firm pay heterogeneity in an
AKM framework, the minimum wage resulted in an approximately equal decline in both compo-
8A recent example of direct evidence on the incidence of firm rents is the work of Furman and Orszag (2015) who
show find increased dispersion in profit rates among publicly listed firms in the United States.
9This is immediately obvious from the decomposition of the overall variance of (log) earnings into between-firm
and with-firm components, see above.
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nents10. Overall the study found that the rise in the real national minimum wage by 119 percent
explains 70 percent of the decline in wage inequality in Brazil over the period.
4.2 Collective bargaining
The minimum wage can be viewed as a special case of collective bargaining, in which the wage
floor is set uniformly across constituencies11. To see this, note that for every minimum wage—
be it national, regional, industry, or occupational—one can replicate its effects by an appropriately
designed system of union bargaining institutions at the respective level of implementation. Hence,
following the same logic as above, collective bargaining may affect the income distribution both
between and within firms.
But different types of collective bargaining may have vastly different effects on the earnings
distribution. Its coverage, which is affected by automatic extension mechanisms and opt-out
clauses, will determine which workers and firms are (not) affected by centralized bargaining out-
comes. For example, if the bargaining power of worker associations in some of the highest-paid
industries is exceptionally strong then the effect of collective bargaining may actually be to exac-
erbate between-firm pay inequality. For example, Alder et al. (2014) study the Rust Belt industrial
region of the United States, in which strong unions used their bargaining power to obtain higher
worker pay. A similar context is that of Brazil’s ABC manufacturing region around São Paulo,
which historically has been the focus of many sectoral and occupational worker unions’ bargain-
ing efforts. Hence, the effects of decentralized bargaining outcomes on the overall earnings distri-
bution is ambiguous.
On the other hand, coordinated wage bargaining at a centralized level can affect the earnings
of the employed much like a national minimum wage would. Such a system naturally has other
drawbacks, potentially including adverse effects on economic growth and the business cycle, as
has been argued in the case of Sweden and Germany. At the same time, it can also effect lower
dispersion in average firm-level wages by leading to higher wages in some enterprises and wage
restraints in others; and simultaneously help to close the within-firm pay gap between unionized
and non-unionized worker groups as exemplified by the cases of Norway and Sweden (Waller-
10See Engbom and Moser (2016).
11If course collective bargaining may involve other employment terms such as hours worked, holidays, equal pay
policies, and other worker rights. In the context of pay inequality, we will focus only on the pay component of collective
bargaining, although the other components may also indirectly affect the wage setting protocol.
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stein, 1999; Barth et al., 2014) and the United States (Card, 1996).
Furthermore, enacting a minimum wage or bargaining agreements tailored to one part of the
earnings distribution potentially can have spillover effects in other parts of the distribution as well.
For example, Lee (1999) studies the extent to which a decline in the minimum wage from 1979 to
1989 in the United States can explain widening dispersion in the entire earnings distribution. He
study finds that spill-over effects of the decline in the real minimum wage have had sizable effects
on the lower half of the earnings distribution. A follow-up study by Autor et al. (2016) casts
doubt on the robustness of these findings over a longer time period, concluding that spill-over
effects of movements in the real minimum wage in the United States between 1979 and 2012 are
indistinguishable from measurement error. Engbom and Moser (2016) find that spillover effects of
the minimum wage in the Brazilian context have been sizable, accounting for approximately one
half of the decline in earnings inequality due to the minimum wage. In light of these findings, a
re-examination of spillover effects due to the minimum wage and other wage setting institutions,
both in the United States and in other contexts, seems warranted.
4.3 Limits to the minimum wage, collective bargaining, and other wage setting insti-
tutions
While much of the above discussion of minimum wages and collective bargaining agreements has
focused on the effects on the earnings distribution conditional on employment, other potentially
adverse effects of such wage setting institutions should not be neglected. There are at least three
reasons why these institutions’ effectiveness may be limited.
First, the debate about the displacement effects of a binding minimum wage floor12 has not
reached a consensus on the elasticities of employment with respect to the minimum wage, and
the employment effects of collective bargaining remain an elusive object in economic research. In
this case, potential surges in non-employment or job downgrading for parts of the labor force have
to be weighed against wage gains for those who remain in full employment.
Second, any binding factor market price floors, which include minimum wages and collective
bargaining agreements, may to some degree be passed down into final goods prices, as Harasztosi
and Lindner (2015) find for the case of a minimum wage introduction in Hungary. To the extent
that consumer prices increase along with workers’ earnings, this channel will counteract some of
12See Card and Krueger (1994) and a rich set of follow-up work.
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the welfare gains for the affected worker groups, thereby limiting the effectiveness of minimum
wage and collective bargaining institutions.
Third and finally, in many lower income countries the informal sector may absorb some of
the previously formal jobs. To the extent that labor market policies and wage agreements are
less enforced in the informal economy relative to the formal sector, the presence of an informal
economy may hence offset any changes in wage institutions that are formally instituted.
4.4 Outsourcing and the boundaries of the firm
One explanation that has been proposed for rising between-firm inequality in the United States
and other countries is an increased assortativeness in the assignment of workers across forms.
Such increases in assortativeness between workers and firms may arise for example from subcon-
tracting and re-defining the boundaries of the firm. Concretely, if low-skill tasks are increasingly
concentrated in specialized enterprise vehicles and “core value” tasks become the focus of the
original businesses, one would expect increasing dispersion in firm-level pay consistent with the
observations of the between- and within-firm inequality literature. Song et al. (2016) argue pre-
cisely for this phenomenon in the context of the United States, where they find that increased
worker segregation explains a substantial share of the rise in between-firm pay inequality in the
United States. This explanation is also broadly consistent with a related literature contrasting the
rising labor productivity with falling labor share in earnings in the United States since the 1980s
(Elsby et al., 2013; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014).
There are reasons to be critical of this trend towards workers’ segregation across specialized
firms by nature of their tasks. For instance, large firms of mostly low-paid workers may derive
large bargaining power, particularly in frictional and local labor markets. With the acquisition of
large market power, these firms may appropriate most of the rents on the table and also provide
lower levels of employer benefits, including health care and pension contributions. Such a shift
may plausibly lead to an erosion of general worker bargaining power, which may squeeze large
parts of the labor force13.
Keeping these critical points in mind, one should not throw the baby out with the bathwater.
Boundaries of firms are picked by optimizing stakeholders and reflect available gains from trade
13See Song et al. (2016) for a further discussion of reasons for why increasing worker segregation across firms can be
problematic from a distributional standpoint.
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and organizational restructuring. Through this lens, the trend towards outsourcing may well be
viewed as efficient. The crux of the matter is whether or not the re-organization is leading to
additional efficiency gains beyond facilitating the redistribution of rents away from workers and
towards capital owners. In this context, it seems reasonable to ensure that workers at all stages of
the supply chain are given adequate rights and social provisions.
How can this be achieved? Reforms to help guarantee workers’ livelihood under changing or-
ganizational structures could involve re-defining legal firm boundaries and making it harder for
large corporations to avoid paying benefits simply by re-defining boundaries of the firm. Ensuring
equal inclusion of all parts of the supply chain in worker unions and collective bargaining agree-
ments, i.e. avoiding conditionalities and opt-out agreements, could be another remedy to this
trend. Alternative measures that work through incentives, rather than restricting firms’ choice
sets, may be equally worth exploring.
4.5 Promoting the right sort of enterprises
Given that measures of firm performance are strongly related to firm-level worker pay (AKM;
Barth et al., 2016; Alvarez et al., 2016), there need not be a trade-off between growth and inequal-
ity. Instead, promoting productivity growth among firms may simultaneously reduce income
inequality on the worker side. For instance, policies that lead to convergence in the firm produc-
tivity distribution can be expected to also close the pay gap among workers. Examples of such
policies are discussed in Moser (2016) and include industrial policies promoting employment and
productivity growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, entry of new competitors, and in-
vestment in product quality-improving innovation. Yet the proposition that policies leading to
productivity gains among the lowest-paying firms also induce wage increases at the bottom of the
distribution, thereby closing the income gap, remains a hypothesis with little empirical evidence
to cite.
4.6 How to deal with inequality within enterprises, and specifically the Top 1%?
Should we target policies directly at inequality within enterprises, and specifically the Top 1%?
Given the earlier discussion of market versus frictional views of wage setting, it is not clear what
constitutes “too much” inequality, especially at the top of the income distribution. Efficient market
theories and in particular theories of organization of the firm suggest that high paid managers and
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CEOs may be paid their marginal product, but that vertical branching out of firm structures leads
to large marginal benefits from small differences in ability at the top of the enterprise management.
Two shared goals seem uncontroversial, at least in theory: First, like for other parts of work-
force it should be guaranteed that managers are paid at or below their marginal product within
the enterprise. Second, compensation contracts should be designed to incentivize among man-
agers to engage in long-term value creation rather than short-term rent extraction. But of course
another question altogether is course how such policies can be efficiently implemented in different
business contexts.
Putting policies into place to promote these goals may require innovative incentive schemes.
For example, public salary disclosures as in Card et al. (2012) and a recently implemented SEC
rule on CEO pay ratio disclosure may make it harder for top managers to extract exorbitant rents
without uproar among both stakeholders and the public. Such transparency could ultimately
feed back into well-informed actions of managers and workers themselves, enhancing long-term
economic growth and stability.
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